The US is sending men to the moon again.
The world met the crew of the plan Artemis II We started our mission in early April and celebrated a 10-day voyage. The voyage should inspire nostalgia and inspire a new generation’s love of human spaceflight.
But after a number of space catastrophes over the past 60 years, the Artemis program must demonstrate NASA’s commitment to safety in getting humans out of Earth’s atmosphere. In the aftermath of these catastrophes, NASA has repeatedly changed its approach to safety. While this is commendable, NASA people often ignored red flags and reports that could have prevented the astronaut’s death.
To do so, NASA must enable NASA employees and contractors to point out potential weaknesses in the program without fear of reprisal. Agencies must ensure that reporting mechanisms work and are responsive and orderly, and that management can and will act on safety concerns. I hope NASA will put effort into this work. Still, some of his NASA staff, including the whistleblower we spoke with, believe NASA still has a long way to go.
NASA was just 9 years old when the fire started. Apollo 1 The command module killed three crew members in 1967. The accident took the American public and many within her NASA by surprise and made it clear that NASA was not ready to build more complex spacecraft. Several people had expressed concerns about the work quality and fire hazards of the prime contractor, North American Airlines (NAA).
These included people who had strong influence on the space program, such as Marshall Space Flight Center Director Werner von Braun and Apollo program director General Sam Phillips. According to documents from the National Archives and his NASA Office of History, in one startling example for the National Archives and his NASA History Division, a project subcontractor told his NASA management about the fire hazard. is the Monday morning quarterback. ”
Decision makers within Project Apollo were focused on deadlines, and no one dared delay the program. They succumbed to groupthink. It was because of a lack of communication between NASA’s Directorate Generals, and because it was not given attention as an important technical milestone that failed to take into account the fact that the three would be flying an entirely new spacecraft. . This led to engineers ignoring warning signs and managers ignoring concerns. Prior to the catastrophe, Joseph Shea, head of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, claimed that the only way fires could start was crew members smoking inside the cabin.
As he said in a 1969 interview, NASA administrator James Webb called the fire a “mismanagement” months after the incident and created a group to oversee and report on the progress of the project. Did. He kicked out program heads, including Shea and his NAA space division head, Harrison Storms. The management sought to shake up Project Apollo’s management structure because the fire had shaken confidence in senior management.
Webb characterized his actions after the tragedy as “saved the system by fixing procedures.”
By all appearances, NASA has become a safety-first agency.But then the shuttle exploded Challenger In 1986, we shattered that assumption. His O-rings, made of rubber that separate sections of the shuttle’s solid-rocket boosters, shrunk in cold weather and malfunctioned, causing a nightmare explosion shortly after launch.
In a story of a failed response to a whistleblower complaint, contractors Morton Thiokol’s Roger Boisjoly and Alan McDonald warned NASA not to launch in subzero temperatures. Joe Sutter, a member of the Rogers Commission investigating the cause of the accident, said NASA’s organizational structure was “conflicting territories, tangled reporting lines, chaotic, top-level leadership focused solely on safety. There was no one,” he concluded.
NASA suspended the Shuttle program for more than two years while considering how to better identify safety risks and how to better manage safety concerns. The agency has set up a Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Office in response to recommendations from the Rogers Commission. Still, it took a third disaster for the agency to be shaken enough to consider formalizing its safety culture.
2003 Shuttle Columbia It split during re-entry, killing seven crew members. The cause of the explosion was that insulating foam that separated from the shuttle’s outer tank during launch struck the leading edge of the shuttle’s wing, breaking the tiles that protected the ship during re-entry. A loose foam problem that has been known for years.
Again, NASA is working to increase safety measures, and Columbia Accident Investigation Board member Tracy Dillinger concludes: [didn’t] We have a systematic way to get feedback. In 2009, more than 40 years after the Apollo fire, NASA finally created an official safety culture program.
Perhaps complacency played a role in all three accidents. This was especially the case with accidents involving shuttles that had become a routine method of space travel. Either way, these tragedies raised pressing questions. That’s how and why red flags are so often ignored or ignored.
This is an open question, says a NASA safety engineer. The engineer has warned of a possible fire concern several times through NASA’s reporting system and believes management is concerned that safety appears to be prioritizing safety over security.
In 2015, a whistleblower informed management of a potential fire risk at the launch pad. nothing has changed. NASA engineers again reported their concerns to NASA’s Office of the Inspector General through NASA’s official safety reporting system. Instead of action, engineers say managers who knew of the concerns offered nothing but sharp criticism. was referred to the Federal Office of Special Counsel. They also submitted their concerns to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, he OSHA.
The engineer said it was unclear if NASA was doing anything about the matter when it was reported through the NASA safety reporting system. There is no formal communication process for whistleblowers. There is no way for whistleblowers to actively communicate with those reviewing their concerns to provide context or suggestions, and the system provides minimal feedback and status updates. To do.
Additionally, they tell us, it wasn’t until last year that a counter-retaliation provision for protected safety disclosures was included.
It’s been 20 years since the Columbia disaster, and NASA’s previous disasters were separated by a little less than 20 years. This is a cadence that cannot be ignored. Artemis II It is scheduled to be released in November 2024. Hopefully, this time, 20 years will be long enough for the astronauts to return home safely.
As we enter a new space race and face pressure to compete with China and other space powers, weaknesses in NASA’s current reporting structure must be eradicated.
Not only does this require the creation of mechanisms to effectively communicate red flags to appropriate managers, but it also requires a top-down cultural shift in which managers do not retaliate or hinder the careers of those who speak out.
To provide a minor edit to James Webb’s remarks, NASA said:Strengthen system by always Correct the procedure. ”
See the official portrait of Artemis II I can’t help but think of the incredible feats that NASA’s released crew members risk their lives to achieve. We also have to think about the people they leave behind here on Earth. I can’t even begin to think how important it is to get these loved ones home safely.
This is an opinion and analysis article and the views expressed by the author or authors are not necessarily Scientific American.
